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This paper examines Virginia Woolf's novel Mrs. 
Dalloway and offers an explanation for Woolf's 
juxtaposition of the two seemingly unrelated narratives of 
Septimus Smith and Clarissa Dalloway. This paper suggests 
that the juxtaposition facilitates Woolf's examination of 
the social structure, a structure which depends upon the 
limitation and control of knowledge for its maintenance. 
Michel Foucault's "The Order of Discourse" provides the 
theoretical structure necessary to study Woolf's characters 
as participants in the various language systems which 
categorize and limit knowledge.
VIRGINIA WOOLF'S MRS. DALLOWAY: 
INTERPRETATION, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER
Virginia Woolf's Mrs. Dalloway tells two distinct 
stories— those of Septimus Smith and Clarissa Dalloway—  
which directly intersect only momentarily near the end of 
the novel. Some critics regard this as a structural flaw, 
others as a deliberate and effective choice on Woolf's part. 
Critics who assume the validity of Woolf's organizational 
choice offer differing explanations for the juxtaposition of 
the two narratives. Phyllis Rose reads the novel as an 
autobiographical document portraying the artist's plight; 
the two narratives elucidate the fine line "between a kind 
of divine intoxication which is the basis of all creativity 
and insanity pure and simple" (Rose 12 6). Jeremy Tambling 
identifies another unifying theme for the two narratives—  
male and female homosexuality (149). He suggests that the 
relationship between Clarissa and Sally Seton parallels that 
of Septimus and Evans. Thus, the juxtaposition highlights 
divergent methods for repressing homosexual impulses.
Deborah Guth finds a link between Septimus and Clarissa in
the motif of "ascent and descent" (18). The opposition of
the two emphasizes the inadequacy of Clarissa's life: while
Septimus soars (and descends) to a world beyond social 
confines, Clarissa remains strictly within societal bounds. 
Explanations such as these often overlook the novel's 
broader social implications. While Guth does direct her 
attention to Clarissa's steadfast adherence to social mores,
she fails to provide a comprehensive and specific study of
2
3Septimus, Clarissa, and the numerous social pressures 
operating on and linking the two characters.
Woolf does not stop with the particularity of class 
systems, the artist's role, the plight of the homosexual, or 
the role of women, but rather exposes the very structure of 
power in Western society, a power based on the logical and 
rational acquisition and possession of knowledge.1 Woolf's 
characters enforce interpretations on others in an assertion 
of power typical of Western society. Mrs. Dalloway makes it 
clear that the powerful members of society maintain the 
rather tenuous status quo by regulating knowledge and the 
power accruing its possession. The two narratives of
definitions for the following terms derive from Michel 
Foucault's "The Order of Discourse" and are discussed in 
greater detail later: knowledge, interpretation, truth, and
force. Foucault assumes that knowledge is nothing more than 
a function of the language used to articulate it. An infinite 
number of intersecting and diverging "discourses" or language 
systems produce knowledge. In this sense, knowledge is only 
knowledge if it adheres to the restrictions of the particular 
discourse employed. Personal interpretations couched in 
acceptable terminology may assume the guise of "knowledge" or 
"truth." In this paper, "interpretation" is used to identify 
such personal efforts to explain meaning within a power-full 
discourse. "Knowledge" and "truth" note interpretations which 
have been successfully articulated within a discourse. In this 
sense, knowledge is nothing more than interpretation. The 
paper examines instances in which personages of power utilize 
personal interpretations presented in the language of a 
particular discourse in order to maintain the status quo. For 
example, Doris Kilman interprets Mrs. Dalloway as a shallow, 
frivolous, and proud woman. This interpretation carries no 
weight since Ms. Kilman is a disenfranchised individual; 
however, when expressed in the rhetoric of Christianity, 
Kilman's view of the "lost and sinful" Clarissa Dalloway gains 
validity as "truth" or "knowledge" because the discourse of 
Christianity bears a significance within the culture which 
Kilman's own views cannot attain.
4Septimus Smith and Clarissa Dalloway present two individuals 
differing in gender, class, education, and experience, and 
the interpretive agents that constrict and mold them and 
limit or expand their access to power.
Woolf*s literary theories and personal experience 
provide ample justification for a reading of the novel as a 
document exposing the use and abuse of knowledge to maintain 
social status and power. An analogy can be drawn between 
Woolf*s denunciation of Edwardian narrative constraints and 
her novel * s attack on the powers that contain knowledge. 
Woolf writes in her 1925 essay, "Modern Fiction": "The
writer seems constrained, not by his own free will but by 
some powerful and unscrupulous tyrant who has him in thrall" 
(The Common Reader 149). Woolf denounces narrative 
convention as the tyrant which limits artistic endeavors to 
articulate meaning, much as she exposes figures in Mrs. 
Dalloway who hinder and/or force compliance with established 
truths and ways of speaking of truth. Admittedly, Woolf's 
comments address a very specific area of literary concern; 
yet, her statement reveals a general distaste for 
limitations on the creative process, whether it be the 
production of a novel or the production of knowledge.
Woolf's frustration with the restriction of individual 
expression is not limited to aesthetics. Through her own 
experience, Woolf developed a fierce hatred for those who 
force the psyche or, as she terms it, "force the soul."
Woolf sent the proofs of Mrs. Dalloway to her friend Jacques
5Raverat. In their notes to The Letters of Virginia Woolf, 
editors Nigel Nicolson and Joanne Trautmann recount that 
Raverat's wife Gwen wrote back to Woolf and remarked on the 
novel's mad scenes (Letters, v.3, p. 153). Woolf writes in 
reply, "It was a subject that I have kept cooling in my mind 
until I felt I could touch it without bursting into flame 
all over. You can't think what a raging furnace it is still 
to me— madness and doctors and being forced" (Letters 180). 
Woolf specifically refers to the rest cure she experienced 
as prescribed treatment for depression. While her comment 
appears to confront an abstract affront to the individuality 
of the soul, it is a reference to the particular 
restrictions of diet, exercise, and writing insisted upon by 
her physicians. Woolf's words suggest at the very least an 
impatience with efforts to impose socially determined 
restrictions on the personal, intellectual freedom of an 
individual. Woolf's use of the word "force" echoes language 
she employs throughout the novel in relation to individuals 
who limit and impose knowledge on others.
Alex Zwerdling has set a critical precedent for 
examining Woolf's commentary on society in Mrs. Dalloway.
He offers as evidence this guotation from Woolf's diary: "I
want to criticise the social system, and to show it at work, 
at its most intense" (57). While Zwerdling draws attention 
to an important aspect of Woolf's work, he does limit the 
scope of his argument to Woolf's treatment of the ruling 
political class and its relationship to the intellectual
6aristocracy of England. I would argue that Woolf's censure 
of society extends beyond class relations to an examination 
of the ideological structure supporting society. Mrs. 
Dalloway exposes various individuals responsible for 
maintaining power by limiting and controlling the production 
of knowledge. Her novel indicts those who employ force to 
impose meaning upon other characters. In this sense the 
bourgeois Holmes, the nouveau riche Bradshaw, and even the 
penniless Miss Kilman, regardless of their class, all 
participate in a larger social system which Woolf 
criticizes.
French linguist and historian Michel Foucault examines 
the way in which collective acceptance and regulation of 
knowledge perpetuate this social system. Like Woolf's 
novel, Foucault's "The Order of Discourse" questions basic 
assumptions regarding language, knowledge, and power. He 
identifies and rejects the assumption that meaning and 
knowledge exist as "truth" free from the subjective biases 
of language. He suggests that truth itself is only a 
function of the language used to articulate it. Foucault 
refutes the Platonic notion, still prevalent today, that 
truth or knowledge reign outside and independent of the 
cultural and social contexts which taint language. On the 
contrary, Foucault suggests that language itself determines 
knowledge and truth.
Foucault defines the term "discourse" as the language 
systems humans use to produce knowledge. While Platonic
7models take ideal truth as an a priori given, Foucault
assumes the human need to control, limit, and create
/
knowledge within specific parameters. Knowledge does not 
and cannot exist outside discourse, which structures and 
limits where, when, what, how, and, most importantly, which 
people can acquire and utilize knowledge and the power it 
yields. Knowledge is not something that conforms to 
discourse so much as it is a product of the way humans talk 
about things. In Foucault's schema, knowledge yields power 
precisely because, by definition, it is a limited commodity- 
-one that not everyone can possess.
Foucault's model clearly assumes the necessity of an 
ordered discourse. Foucault suggests that humans find the 
very uncertainty of existence highly disconcerting. This 
general uncertainty may originate in the possibility that 
meaning is limitless and truth infinite. Humans respond by 
establishing limitations and institutions which enforce such 
limits. For example, religions enforce specific guidelines 
for the nature of truth and provide codes of behavior to 
ensure spiritual salvation in another world free from 
uncertainty. Governments offer security on a secular level 
by dictating correct civic behavior and protecting humans 
from each other. The unwritten guidelines governing the 
production of knowledge also purport to maintain the 
stability of a culture.
Foucault analyzes this web of discourses and identifies 
what he terms "procedures of exclusion" which restrict the
8production of knowledge, meaning, and truth: the
prohibition, the opposition of reason and madness, and the 
opposition of true and false. The first of these means of 
exclusion, the prohibition, groups under one heading the 
basic restrictions experienced by humans when speaking. The 
opposition of reason and madness controls potentially more 
damaging elements in society by labeling as "mad” those who 
differ from the norm. The opposition of true and false 
successfully negates ideas or practices which challenge what 
humans accept as knowledge by labelling them "false."
The first of these procedures of exclusion, the 
prohibition, includes restrictions on the topics, the 
occasions for speech, and on which individuals have the 
right to speak on certain privileged topics. A reciprocal 
relationship exists between the privileged speaker and the 
privileged topic: the speaker gains power because he/she
has the right to address certain topics, and at the same 
time, the topic gains authority because only certain 
individuals can talk about it. Foucault cites politics and 
sexuality as two examples of privileged topics, topics which 
carry with them numerous restrictions on not only who 
addresses them but also on when and where such discussions 
may take place. Foucault argues that the treatment of these 
two topics within discourse indicates the degree to which 
the production of meaning is, in fact, dominated by the 
forces of power and desire, not an a priori truth.
9While strict prohibitions concerning the circumstances 
of speech limit discourse considerably, a second principle 
of exclusion eliminates a more dangerous threat to the 
ordered discourse. The opposition of reason and madness 
reinforces the social hierarchy and at the same time labels 
as "mad” that which does not conform to "normal" limits on 
behavior, such as those identified by religious, 
governmental, and other institutional bodies. This 
opposition emphasizes the prominent role of language in 
maintaining social structures, for it is the madman's words 
which constitute his difference from the system: "It was
through his words that his madness was recognized: they
were the place where the division between reason and madness 
was exercised" (1155). Foucault notes that as the twentieth 
century institutionalized the treatment of the mentally ill, 
it created a new discourse to rationalize the madman's 
speech and give it meaning. Psychoanalysis strips madness 
of its threatening aspects and confines it to scientific 
inquiry. More importantly, psychoanalysis validates itself 
by its ability to discover "truth" or meaning in the 
madman's initially indecipherable and therefore potentially 
subversive speech.
Foucault classifies this "will to truth," the 
compulsion to discern meaning in all language usage, as the 
third principle of exclusion, the opposition of true and 
false. The western will to truth denies the arbitrariness 
of truth and its historical production (1156). Plato's
10
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rejection of the Sophists* arguments determined that "the 
highest truth no longer resided in what discourse was or 
did, but in what it said" (1156). Thus, truth masquerades 
as an a priori given free from the biases of desire and 
power which characterize language use. As with the other 
procedures of exclusion, the will to truth "rests on an 
institutional support: it is both reinforced and renewed by
a whole strata of practices" (1157). The institution 
dictates that truth must conform to the limitations 
established by the discourse. Just as institutions and 
their authorities use the term "mad" to exclude and contain 
individuals who threaten social stability, so they also 
employ the term "false" to negate ideas or practices which 
challenge what humans accept as knowledge.
Foucault makes a distinction between "the truth" and 
being "within the true" by turning to history for an 
example. While today's scientific community accepts Gregor 
Mendel's genetic theories as "truth," his peers rejected 
those theories because they did not conform to the current 
"conceptual instruments" or "theoretical foundations." 
Despite the fact that Mendel's discoveries are "true," he 
was not "in the true" during his lifetime because his model 
operated outside the established frame of reference or 
discourse for biological meaning (1161). Human 
institutions mistakenly equate things or ideas that are 
simply "within the true" with the "truth." Foucault notes, 
"One is 'in the true' only by obeying the rules of a
11
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discursive 'policing'” (1161). Therefore, truth has very 
little to do with the actual veracity of a statement and 
much more to do with whether or not the statement 
corresponds to current patterns of thinking.
A fear of the unlimited proliferation of meaning 
motivates the urge to restrict discourse:
It is just as if prohibitions, barriers, 
thresholds, and limits had been set up in order to 
master, at least partly, the great proliferation 
of discourse, in order to remove from its richness 
the most dangerous part, and in order to organize 
its disorder according to figures which dodge what 
is most uncontrollable about it. (1164)
Foucault argues that personal, political, and institutional 
concerns control the discourses which produce knowledge. In 
Mrs. Dalloway. we can indeed trace this pattern. Woolf's 
characters each produce readings based on their personal and 
communal predisposition. While all the characters share 
this quality, some do not attempt to force their readings 
onto others. On the other hand, some characters make it 
their business to do precisely that. These persons confine 
meaning within the limitations of collective knowledge in 
order to maintain societal stability and avoid the dangers 
suggested by the possibility of infinite meaning: namely,
that restrictions on behavior become invalid if meaning has 
no boundaries and if there is no one "truth” on any subject. 
Foucault writes:
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In every society the production of discourse is at 
once controlled, selected, organized, and 
redistributed by a certain number of procedures 
whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, 
to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade 
its ponderous, formidable materiality. (1155) 
Foucault uses the phrase "ward off," suggesting that the 
parameters of discourses cannot categorically control or 
streamline the production of knowledge. Foucault's model is 
one of numerous layers and intersections, not a monolithic 
construction dominated by some formal intellectual policing. 
Nonetheless, discourses do function to produce knowledge and 
meaning within established norms.
Mrs. Dalloway presents characters involved in moments 
of interpretive conflict which correspond to the 
constraining aspects of discourse Foucault identifies. The 
conflict between Septimus and his doctors illustrates what 
Foucault identifies as the prohibition against madness and 
its consequences; that conflict, in turn, illuminates the 
way Mrs. Dalloway is more subtly constrained by the 
prohibitions and restrictions of the discourses in which she 
lives. An examination of the discursive forces affecting 
Septimus Smith and Clarissa Dalloway explains the 
juxtaposition of their two stories. Woolf clearly attacks 
interpretive force by showing stereotypical villains 
confronting the pathetic victim. However, the complexities 
of Mrs. Dalloway and her set highlight the difficulties
13
attending any attempt to escape from the interpretive 
constraints of the social structure.
Two early scenes in Mrs. Dalloway emphasize the 
limitations governing interpretation and point to the 
usefulness of Foucault*s essay as a tool for reading Woolf's 
novel. In the first scene, an unidentified car passes and 
by-standers speculate about its occupants. The second scene 
presents the crowd's evolving interpretation of sky-writing. 
The "readings" in both scenes suggest that interpretation 
and knowledge appear highly diverse, but are, in fact, 
produced within culturally determined parameters. Woolf's 
pointed reference to the professions of the observers in the 
first scene underlines the remarkable uniformity of 
interpretation despite the varied backgrounds and 
professions of the onlookers. Rezia Smith, the young 
immigrant wife, wonders, "Was it the Queen in there— the 
Queen going shopping?" and, Edgar J. Watkiss "said audibly, 
humorously of course: 'The Proime Minister's kyar'" (2 0-
21). Clarissa Dalloway herself concludes, "It is probably 
the Queen" (23). When the chauffeur shows a card to the 
policeman, Mrs. Dalloway admits uncertainty by acknowledging 
that the card could be "inscribed with a name,— the Queen's, 
the Prince of Wales's, the Prime Minister's?" (24-25). This 
apparent uncertainty exists within reassuring boundaries, 
however, as Clarissa lists very specific and limited options 
for the car's occupants— members of the British ruling 
elite. Rezia Smith, a milliner, Edgar J. Watkiss, a
14
laborer, and Clarissa Dalloway, a wealthy housewife, all 
conclude that the occupant must be some member of the ruling 
class. In Foucault's terms, they interpret within 
acceptable guidelines. An object requires interpretation— a 
luxurious car with shaded windows to which even the 
policeman gives deference. No one suggests that such a car 
could contain a charwoman or even a wealthy underworld 
figure. These possibilities cannot exist "in the true" and 
are never considered as solutions to the interpretive 
dilemma the car presents. No, it must carry a personage of 
wealth, closely affiliated with power and the law as 
indicated by the policeman's salute. The incident ends
v
without establishing any definitive interpretation. Woolf 
never indicates who actually occupies the car, suggesting 
that truth often has very little to do with fact or reality 
and much more to do with the discourse restrictions on what 
can and cannot be true.
The sky-writing incident provides another occasion to 
observe individual interpretations. As with the car, 
interpretations of the sky-writing develop within 
predictable limits. The observers immediately assign the 
writing a generic classification. They know to interpret 
the sky-writing as an advertisement and begin suggesting 
trade names, "Glaxo" or "Kreemo." In addition, the 
assumption underlying these interpretive suggestions is that 
the words will undoubtedly offer meaning. When the sky­
writing begins, Woolf writes, "Everyone looked up" (29).
This simple statement emphasizes the human desire to 
interpret, categorize, and assign meaning. Such responses 
confirm Foucault*s assessment of the overwhelming human 
compulsion to establish meaning. Both the car and sky­
writing incidents set the tone for Woolf's exploration of 
the interpretive process throughout the novel. The 
similarity of interpretation in the two scenes points to the 
usefulness of Foucault's writings to a study of Mrs. 
Dalloway.
These early scenes present readings that loosely 
approximate an interpretive norm. There is little conflict 
over differing readings because each individual offers 
interpretations that fit societal expectations. The 
treatment of Septimus Smith moves Woolf's examination of 
interpretation to a level where more is at stake than idle 
speculation about cars and sky-writing. Traumatized by his 
own loss of feeling during World War I, Septimus appears 
unable to interpret within the "normal” limits of societal 
discourse. He unwittingly rejects society's discourse of 
power and knowledge. In its place, Septimus adopts a 
discourse of knowledge rooted in the visionary. Septimus's 
keen sensitivity to the natural world renders him tragically 
dysfunctional in terms of societal norms. However, the 
veteran, consumed by his loss of feeling, finds in nature 
the only connection he can make with a fragmented and 
violent world. While others around him puzzle over the
16
problem of interpreting the sky writing, Septimus examines a 
different text— nature, the trees, the birds:
The sparrows fluttering, rising, and falling in 
jagged fountains were part of the pattern; the 
white and blue, barred with black branches.
Sounds made harmonies with premeditation; the 
spaces between them were as significant as the 
sounds. (33)
Septimus's thoughts rather efficiently dispel traditional 
models of knowing. Generally, interpretive energies 
concentrate on substance, not emptiness; a passing car, sky­
writing, or the music of the birds merit interpretation, not 
necessarily the silence between the songs. Septimus 
reverses such tendencies. For him, the pauses between the 
bird's songs are as meaningful and significant as the music 
itself. As Foucault indicates, in Western ideology, humans 
may interpret within a specific discourse as long as they 
adhere to a number of limitations— language, grammar, 
reason, material reality. Septimus to some degree 
disregards these boundaries and attempts to find meaning in 
other alternatives. Even Septimus, however, utilizes 
traditional elements of the interpretive process. While he 
elevates the visionary, he does so by employing tactics of 
the rational world. He notes that the sparrows are part of 
a "pattern," just as the observers in the earlier scenes 
find a pattern— a narrow list of possible car occupants or a 
genre for the sky-writing. Similarly, the sounds Septimus
17
hears do not form dissonances, but harmonies which are 
examples of musical patterns. Thus, although Septimus 
operates outside the discourse of power and knowledge, he 
unconsciously continues to utilize elements of the 
discourse.
Woolf*s highly ironic account of Septimus before the 
war gives the reader a clearer sense of his change after the 
war. As a young, self-instructed intellectual, he exhibits 
a tendency toward romantic idealism, even likening himself 
to Keats (128). Seeking access to the circle of the 
intellectual elite, Septimus reads Darwin and Shakespeare, 
acquiring the language and knowledge necessary to belong. 
Consequently, Woolf writes that when war broke out,
"Septimus was one of the first to volunteer. He went to 
France to save an England which consisted almost entirely of 
Shakespeare's plays and Miss Isabel Pole in a green dress 
walking in a square" (130). Woolf's irony highlights the 
naivete characterizing Septimus as well as many other 
volunteer soldiers. Septimus returns without his idealism, 
emotionally maimed, and unable to "feel."
Like many shell-shock victims, Septimus, frightened by 
his own loss of sympathy with other humans, leaves the war 
disillusioned with the old values. His case provides an 
example of how a loss of communal values leads to insanity, 
unhappiness, and isolation. A victim of the horrors of 
modern war, Septimus has lost his ability to accept the way 
most people see and understand things.
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Despite conflicting impulses, Septimus operates 
primarily outside the established rules for understanding 
the world. An ordered discourse limits both the way things 
are said and what can be said. Septimus disregards both 
prohibitions. While sitting on a park bench, he muses, "Men 
must not cut down trees. There is a God. (He noted such 
revelations on the backs of envelopes.) Change the world.
No one kills from hatred. Make it known (he wrote it down)" 
(35). While each declaration on its own is logical, it is 
the lack of transition which renders the progression itself 
illogical. Septimus does not order his thoughts logically 
or rationally, and the simple imperative, "Change the 
world," could clearly threaten social norms if Septimus ever 
joined his words with actions. Septimus continues to 
repudiate the socially valuated oppositions upon which 
Foucault suggests an ordered society is based, love/hate and 
good/evil:
The supreme secret must be told to the Cabinet; 
first that trees are alive; next there is no 
crime; next love, universal love, he muttered, 
gasping, trembling, painfully drawing out these 
profound truths which needed, so deep were they, 
so difficult, an immense effort to speak out, but 
the world was entirely changed by them for ever. 
(102)
Notably, even Septimus cannot resist the desire to make his 
insights an accepted "truth" by declaring them to the
19
Cabinet. However, because his words do not conform to the 
order of discourse dictating what can be "in the true," they 
cannot possibly be regarded as truth. The principle of 
"universal love" is belied by the fervor of war and the 
statement that there is "no crime" would seem equally 
untenable.
Regardless, Septimus experiences the powerful need to 
record personal truth through writing. While thinking, 
Septimus fumbles for a card and pencil. Later, of course, 
Dr. Bradshaw will have a card at hand to record information 
about Septimus*s symptoms. The repetition of the card 
encourages the reader to compare Septimus1s use of writing 
with that of Dr. Bradshaw*s. While Bradshaw notes symptoms 
in order to categorize and confine the mental instability of 
Septimus, Septimus uses language in a less systematic 
fashion.
Septimus strikes at what Foucault identifies as the 
heart of the discourse of power— the will to truth (1156). 
Septimus muses, "It might be possible that the world itself 
is without meaning" (133). Septimus denies that 
interpretation can have any real purpose since the goal of 
the interpretive process and the discourse governing its 
operation is to find meaning. The physicians Holmes and 
Bradshaw who both classify and explain do assume the 
existence of meaning. Septimus, on the other hand, 
questions one of the assumptions underlying the 
establishment of any social structure. By questioning
20
meaning, he challenges society*s system of ordering, 
prerogative for power, and reason for being. Indeed, it is 
through interpretations that characters in the novel 
frequently justify themselves; thus Septimus's comment 
undermines both collective meaning and individual
significance. When confronted with such talk, the powerful
1
elite have two choices: Holmes's to refuse to take such
ravings seriously, or Bradshaw's to label the speaker insane 
and exclude him from contact with society.
With the introduction of the two doctors, Woolf makes 
the dangers of interpretive force clear, and at the same 
time illustrates the necessity of interpretation to 
existence. Some critics argue that Woolf's characterization 
of the novel's physicians originates in her own unhappy 
experience with psychiatric treatment. Sue Thomas notes 
that critics read "Woolf's treatment of Septimus Smith's 
mental illness as a reflection of her anger at the rest 
cures prescribed for her during her own mental breakdowns in 
1913 and 1915" (49). As a result, the two characters,
Holmes and Bradshaw, suffer from the sharpness of Woolf's 
ironic pen. In Drs. Holmes and Bradshaw, Woolf creates 
caricatures of the bumbling general practitioner and the 
social-climbing, highly trained specialist. However,
Woolf's portrayals of the doctors are more than simple 
ironic sketches. Woolf makes quite clear their partial 
responsibility for Septimus Smith's death. They are, at the 
very least, agents for the system which destroys Septimus.
21
Not born to the ruling elite, Sir William Bradshaw uses 
knowledge to earn him power and society's approbation. With 
the approval of society, Dr. Bradshaw controls those 
elements which threaten social norms. Woolf articulates the 
origin of Bradshaw's power:
Sir William not only prospered himself but made 
England prosper, secluded her lunatics, forbade 
childbirth, penalised despair, made it impossible 
for the unfit to propagate their views until they, 
too, shared his sense of proportion. (150)
As Foucault notes, the preservation of communal institutions 
demands the exclusion of the mad, a job Bradshaw performs 
with the blessing of the ruling class. His labors have, in 
fact, earned him a title. In her assessment of the politics 
of Woolf's novel, Pamela Transue elaborates this perspective 
on Bradshaw: "By labelling all dissenting voices as sick, he 
consolidates his vision in society" (97). While she 
articulates well the nature of Bradshaw's work, Transue's 
appraisal does not hold society accountable in the way Woolf 
clearly does. Bradshaw epitomizes society's "vision," not 
simply his own. In addition, Bradshaw himself combines 
several conflicting discourses to power. While he has won 
society's approval through his professional service, he 
yearns for acceptance by the social elite. His social- 
climbing tactics make him the butt of Woolf's irony and only 
a marginally welcome guest at Clarissa's party.
22
Nevertheless, Bradshaw's interaction with the Smiths 
aligns him with the power of the ruling elite. A well- 
appointed motor car idles outside his office when Rezia and 
Septimus Smith first arrive. This detail should remind 
readers of the earlier scene in which the mysterious motor 
car with "dove-gray upholstery" prompts numerous 
interpretations from bystanders (19). The car operates as a 
symbol tying Bradshaw explicitly to the power of the ruling 
class. Woolf's repetition of the grey car invites readers 
to compare the earlier scene with what takes place in Dr. 
Bradshaw's office. While the bystanders supply 
interpretations which fit a pattern of "normal" readings, 
Septimus Smith cannot do this because of his progressive 
mental breakdown and, more importantly, his failure to share 
the basic assumptions governing the interpretations of the 
bystanders. For example, he does not necessarily assume 
that skywriting must have a meaning. Therefore, Dr.
Bradshaw must help Smith conform to social norms.
Bradshaw displays his professional efficiency only two 
or three minutes into the interview when he determines 
categorically: "It was a case of complete breakdown—
complete physical and nervous breakdown, with every symptom 
in an advanced stage, he ascertained . . . (writing answers 
to questions, murmured discreetly, on a pink card)" (144). 
Justifying society's trust in him, Bradshaw tags Septimus as 
"a case of complete breakdown" and takes the first step in 
returning Septimus to the interpretive norms maintained by
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society. Bradshaw's move corresponds to what Foucault 
identifies as the opposition of reason and madness, one of 
the mechanisms operating to maintain social order.
Certainly, Bradshaw acts in accordance with the demands of 
his profession. However, his treatment of Septimus points 
to the limitations of the medical profession. While the 
doctor must diagnose the patient in order to suggest a cure, 
there is a danger in the inaccuracy and misattribution of 
labels. Woolf highlights a problem inherent in discourse 
systems like the medical profession— in order to effect 
cures, medical knowledge must be accepted as "truth," yet, 
often, this truth is only partial at best.
Bradshaw continues to question Septimus, "You served 
with great distinction in the War?" (145). Instead of 
answering the question, Septimus repeats "the word 'war' 
interrogatively" (145). At this, Bradshaw concludes, "He 
[Septimus] was attaching meanings to words of a symbolical 
kind. A serious symptom, to be noted on the card" (145). 
Although Septimus is perfectly logical in repeating a 
question, Bradshaw notes this as a "serious symptom." Dr. 
Bradshaw's assessment leads to several questions: Why is
attaching symbolical meanings a symptom of madness? Why 
does Dr. Bradshaw term this a "serious symptom"? Septimus's 
interrogative repetition of the word "war" could suggest 
that meaning may very well be limitless and wholly relative. 
If this is the case, then Septimus's symbolic meaning
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violates what Foucault notes as the unconscious need for 
established meaning, order, and limitations on truth.
To fulfill society*s mandate to regulate such a threat, 
Bradshaw must classify, interpret, and "read" Septimus. He 
must force Septimus to accept, either by default or 
volition, the interpretation society demands for its 
perpetuation. Sir William tells Rezia, "He [Septimus] had 
threatened to kill himself. There was no alternative. It 
was a question of law" (146). By invoking the "law," 
Bradshaw reveals the mechanism operating beneath the veneer 
of psychiatric expertise and solicitude for the well-being 
of his client. In effect, Septimus has violated society's 
code, broken the law, and must be punished. It is 
Bradshaw's duty to enforce the "cure" which in Foucault's 
terms consists of exclusion from society.
Bradshaw's reading, although clothed in the robes of 
professional prerogative and societal duty, grows out of 
personal prejudices as surely as does Septimus's symbolical 
understanding of the word "war." Bradshaw resents Septimus 
as a threat to society, but more importantly, as an affront 
to his own system of values:
The fellow made a distasteful impression. For 
there was in Sir William, whose father had been a 
tradesman, a natural respect for breeding and 
clothing, which shabbiness nettled; again, more 
profoundly, there was in Sir William, who had 
never had time for reading, a grudge, deeply
25
buried, against cultivated people who came into 
his room and intimated that doctors, whose 
profession is a constant strain upon all the 
highest faculties, are not educated men. (147) 
Bradshaw’s personal insecurities fuel his inclination to 
isolate Septimus and urge him to use the power of his 
knowledge to show this troubled intellectual who really is 
in control. Thus, Septimus is forced into a rest cure which 
may or may not help him. As Dr. Bradshaw concludes, "One of 
my homes, Mr. Warren Smith . . . will teach you to rest" 
(147) [emphasis mine]. Bradshaw seeks refuge in communal 
knowledge and discourse in order to force his own 
interpretation and vent his own insecurities. His personal 
interpretations have become, in part, indistinguishable from 
dominant social ones, thus ensuring his position.
Ultimately, Bradshaw is merely an agent of the larger social 
forces he serves. He bears responsibility as a member of a 
profession in which the abuse of often limited and 
incomplete knowledge can be devastating.
Bradshaw's ability to conform to communal interpretive 
structures characterizes his passion for order. Through a 
single symbol, Woolf aptly presents Bradshaw as the 
quintessential orderer of discourse. Throughout the novel, 
several objects take on symbolic value as signs: Peter
Walsh's knife, Richard Dalloway's roses, and Dr. Bradshaw's 
pink card. Each character's reaction to these signs 
reflects their epistemology. Bradshaw's pink card becomes a
fitting objective correlative for the move to ward off the 
danger of the unfathomable by classifying, naming, and 
confining it. While the card' may be a benign pink, it 
signifies Bradshaw's limited epistemological notions. For 
Bradshaw, it is inconceivable that individual meaning could 
be any different from collective meaning— they should be as 
inseparable as two sides of a piece of paper, of a pink 
filing card. Bradshaw assumes that what he writes on the 
card is "truth" based on scientific, rational knowledge. He 
does not recognize that the words simply gain power as 
"truth" because they conform to the discourse. Thus, Dr. 
Bradshaw wielding the power accorded him by society and 
merited by his professional knowledge, systematically treats 
by exclusion those who defy traditional norms of 
interpretation.
Perhaps because he lacks specific psychiatric 
knowledge, Dr. Holmes is a more damaging interpretive 
figure than Dr. Bradshaw. Holmes misinterprets by denying 
the existence of an illness. Lacking a more sophisticated 
discourse for interpretation, Dr. Holmes places Septimus's 
disconcerting behavior in a personal context: Septimus is
simply "in a funk," a malady that even plagues the doctor 
himself— easily cured by a round of golf or an outing to the 
symphony (139). By comparing Septimus's illness to his own 
needs for a holiday, Holmes ignores the severity of 
Septimus's illness and imposes his own meaning on the young 
man. Holmes's interpretation lacks the power of Bradshaw's
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psychiatric discourse because it does not draw upon the 
strength of complex medical terminology. The phrase, "in a 
funk," cannot compare with "a case of complete breakdown." 
"In a funk" does not suggest the power of medical authority, 
whereas "a case of complete breakdown" bears the weight of 
an institution. Holmes employs questionable, if less 
imposing, language to control and safely categorize 
Septimus*s malady. He persists in minimizing its 
significance: "Dr. Holmes came again. Large, fresh
coloured, handsome, flicking his boots, looking in the 
glass, he brushed it all aside— headaches, sleeplessness, 
fears, dreams— nerve symptoms and nothing more" (138). At 
this point, Holmes could appear a benign but ignorant fool. 
However, in his ignorance, Holmes proves a far more forceful 
and dangerous healer.
Woolf emphasizes this by replicating Holmes's disregard 
for Septimus*s symptoms in the doctor's physical 
brusqueness: Holmes physically forces or brushes aside
Rezia Smith on two different occasions. The first instance 
in which Holmes's gestures mimic his professional stance 
occurs during a house call. Rezia informs him that Septimus 
will not see him. Dr. Holmes, "smiling agreeably," ignores 
such wishes: "Really he had to give that charming little
lady, Mrs. Smith, a friendly push before he could get past 
her into her husband's bedroom" (138). Holmes invades the 
Smith's home on a medical prerogative. In place of the 
specialized knowledge which authorizes Bradshaw, Holmes
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invokes another form of knowledge and power— professional 
experience. As a physician with "forty years' experience," 
Holmes expects cooperation from the couple who, after all, 
have gone to him for help. Although unwilling to admit that 
Septimus is in anything more than a funk, Holmes does at 
times read Septimus's illness as a serious breach of 
traditional "English" values. In condescending tones,
Holmes stresses the importance of societal norms:
He [Septimus] had actually talked of killing 
himself to his wife, quite a girl, a foreigner, 
wasn't she? Didn't that give her a very odd idea 
of English husbands? Didn't one owe perhaps a 
duty to one's wife? Wouldn't it be better to do 
something instead of lying in bed? (13 9)
Woolf ironizes the bumbling general practitioner. However, 
this scene is not simply a comic tableau of the doctor's 
ineptness, for it is one in a series of interviews which 
ultimately lead to Septimus's suicide. Through questions he 
clearly deems rhetorical, Holmes urges Septimus to adopt 
collective meaning and habits. Without the sophistication 
of a Dr. Bradshaw, Holmes essentially accuses Septimus of 
violating the rules of discourse by failing to conform to 
behavioral norms.
By violating behavioral norms, Septimus has apparently 
relinquished any personal liberties. Dr. Holmes's second 
physical forcing emphasizes this. Just before Septimus 
dies, Rezia bars Holmes's way, "No. I will not allow you to
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see my husband." Woolf then leads the reader into the 
doctor's perspective: "He could see her, like a little hen, 
with her wings spread barring his passage. But Holmes 
persevered. 'My dear lady, allow me . . .' Holmes said, 
putting her aside (Holmes was a powerfully built man)"
(225). Thus, Holmes acts in a violent, abusive, and 
threatening way, disregarding the wishes of his patient. He 
insists upon bullying them into accepting his interpretation 
of Smith's illness, thus precipitating Septimus's reluctant 
suicide. Through Holmes, Woolf illustrates that the 
possession of a little knowledge in conjunction with the 
authority of position can be more lethal than a great deal 
of knowledge.
Septimus's opposition to the doctors seems an extreme 
example of highly restrictive forces combatting a much less 
systematic participation in the society's discourse of 
power, knowledge, and interpretation. The themes 
crystallized in the Septimus Smith narrative become more 
multi-faceted and complex in Clarissa Dalloway's sphere of 
influence. The Septimus Smith narrative gains credibility 
as Woolf presents the themes of his narrative in the life of 
a middle-class, enfranchised member of society. Rather than 
the one-sided attack Septimus finds himself a victim of, 
Clarissa finds herself surrounded by people operating in a 
web of conflicting orders or structures for establishing 
meaning— Christianity, social rhetoric, social reform, and 
intellectualism. Various characters utilize these orders to
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compose "readings" of Clarissa and force her into an 
acceptance of their interpretations.
Doris Kilman, one of Mrs. Dalloway's more antagonistic 
satellites, employs the order of Christian doctrine to 
produce interpretations. Although Miss Kilman is clearly 
less powerful than the Drs. Bradshaw and Holmes, she, too, 
attempts to constrain interpretations— especially those of 
Clarissa Dalloway— in the name of "truth." Clarissa's first 
description of Miss Kilman uses language which echoes the 
characterizations of Drs. Holmes and Bradshaw. Clarissa 
calls her "one of those spectres who stand astride us and 
suck up half our life-blood, dominators and tyrants" (16- 
17). Admittedly, Clarissa's resentment of Miss Kilman's 
friendship with her daughter Elizabeth colors her 
characterization, as does her supercilious class- 
consciousness exemplified by her repeated formula, "Miss 
Kilman in her mackintosh" (186). However, these 
qualifications do not alter the accuracy of Mrs. Dalloway's 
assessment. In fact, Miss Kilman verifies such a reading on 
a number of occasions. For example, while taking tea with 
Elizabeth, she reflects, "If she could grasp her 
[Elizabeth], if she could clasp her, if she could make her 
hers absolutely and forever and then die; that was all she 
wanted" (199-200). Doris Kilman's desire to possess 
corresponds to the controlling maneuvers of both Drs. Holmes 
and Bradshaw. While Holmes and Bradshaw act to serve the 
public good, Doris Kilman's motivation is intensely
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personal—  sexual desire disguised as religious or 
educational motivation. Nonetheless, Kilman's impulse to 
control replicates the misguided force behind the doctors' 
attempts to treat Septimus. However, there is a marked 
difference between the power these two men exercise and that 
which Kilman aspires to and believes she possesses.
Kilman's power is essentially illusory, simply a construct 
of words, while the power of the doctors is tangible and 
sanctioned by society. Herein, according to Foucault, lies 
the irony of power (1156). Humans covet the promise of 
power, but do not recognize that it is nothing more than a 
construct of language, a discourse to which only certain 
members of society will ever be allowed access. Power only 
results from the ability to possess and use the discourse. 
While the doctors' power is also a construct of language, 
their words are invested with a power that Doris Kilman can 
never possess. Kilman, as a middle-aged, unmarried woman 
who sympathized with Germany during the World War, violates 
traditional social norms. She has, in fact, been excluded 
by society as a result of her war time sympathies: "It was
true that the family was of German origin; spelt the name 
Kiehlman in the eighteenth century; but her brother had been 
killed. They turned her out because she would not pretend 
that the Germans were all villains" (187). Because she 
refused to accept an interpretation predominant during the 
war against Germany, Kilman was banished. Ironically, 
however, Kilman, blinded by the lure of power, employs the
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very methods whose force and language marginalized her in 
the first place.
Because Kilman feels her social insignificance, she 
attempts to gain leverage by the use of exclusive and 
excluding knowledge. Several times, Miss Kilman reminds 
herself that "Her knowledge of modern history was more than 
respectable" (200). No longer able to use that knowledge as 
a means to socially sanctioned respectability and authority, 
Miss Kilman must adopt a new method to gain precedence. She 
manipulates the doctrines of Christianity to produce a 
reading of Clarissa which suits her own predisposition to 
resent the wealthy housewife. Kilman is able to pity 
Clarissa by assigning her a place in a far more imposing 
interpretive structure, one whose transcendent claims 
outshine the superficial hierarchies of the Dalloway world. 
Christian doctrine embraces all members of society, teaches 
that it is more difficult for the rich to reach the kingdom 
of God, and offers as its icon a penniless carpenter. Thus, 
Christianity is readily accessible and appealing to the 
disenfranchised Kilman and, through it, she disguises her 
personal interpretation of Clarissa Dalloway in the communal 
rhetoric of doctrine.
The precepts of Christianity give Miss Kilman the power 
to pity the wealthy. She recalls the shift in her 
interpretive structure: "Then Our Lord had come to her (and
here she always bowed her head). She had seen the light two 
years and three months ago. Now she did not envy women like
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Clarissa Dalloway; she pitied them" (187-188). Regardless 
of its illusory nature, such power satisfies Kilman's 
penchant for domination: "So now, whenever the hot and
painful feelings boiled within her, this hatred of Mrs. 
Dalloway, this grudge against the world, she thought of God" 
(188). Ironically, it is precisely this power to pity that 
might have characterized Clarissa's general reaction to Miss 
Kilman before she came to detest the woman's influence on 
Elizabeth. Thus, through religious discourse Miss Kilman 
attempts a reversal of the power relationship between 
herself and her employer. If she cannot possess the social 
stature of a Mrs. Dalloway, she can achieve satisfaction in 
supposed moral superiority by adopting the language of 
Christianity. Foucault notes that religious doctrines 
establish a unit of people defined by their common beliefs 
(1162). Kilman's adherence to Christian doctrine insures 
that she is now at the center of a social discourse from 
which Clarissa is excluded.
Much as Drs. Bradshaw and Holmes manipulate their 
professional knowledge to suit personal prejudices, so Miss 
Kilman tempers her desire for domination with the rhetoric 
of Christianity:
And there rose in her an overmastering desire to 
overcome her [Clarissa]; to unmask her. If she 
could have felled her it would have eased her.
But it was not the body; it was the soul and its 
mockery that she wished to subdue; make feel her
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mastery. If only she could make her weep; could 
ruin her; humiliate her; bring her to her knees 
crying, You are right! But this was God's will, 
not Miss Kilman's. It was to be a religious 
victory. So she glared; so she glowered. (189) 
Miss Kilman describes here an ecstatic conversion in which 
she acts as priest to the weeping, penitent Clarissa 
Dalloway. The fact that this is more than a "religious 
victory" is quite clear. Like Drs. Holmes and Bradshaw,
Miss Kilman actually seeks to force her interpretation; 
Clarissa must validate the Kilman reading of her wasteful 
life by crying, "You are right!" Of course, because Kilman 
has no real power in social currency, she is incapable of 
the type of damage Holmes and Bradshaw wreck. Elizabeth 
easily escapes her grasp after their outing to the Shops. 
Thus, Kilman simply becomes an example of a marginalized 
figure who adopts the very moves that rendered her powerless 
in the first place. Kilman illustrates that even the 
marginalized individual who has been brutalized by the 
discourse can regard its promise of power as compensation 
for its accompanying evils.
Doris Kilman bases her illusory sense of power on the 
transcendent scheme of Christianity; in contrast, Hugh 
Whitbread grounds his power in the less ideologically 
centered, but no less forceful, order of social rhetoric. 
Hugh's rhetorical abilities have earned him a position of 
influence in the most visible structure of societal
authority, the court. Despite the fact that friends mock 
him for "his little job at court," Hugh exercises a great 
deal of power through the manipulation of language (7). In 
Foucault's terms, Hugh creates "truth" by conforming ideas 
to the established interpretive guidelines. It is this 
ability which makes him serviceable to Lady Bruton: "Hugh .
. . thus marvellously reduced Lady Bruton's tangles to 
sense, to grammar such as the editor of the Times, Lady 
Bruton felt, watching the marvellous transformation, must 
respect" (166). By transforming Lady Bruton's notions into 
words which the Times editor "must respect," Hugh produces 
"truth" which conforms to the limits of the discourse. Lady 
Bruton feels that if Hugh writes for her, she will be "sure 
of being somehow right" (166). Although Hugh's efforts seem 
no more than a sycophantic attempt to satisfy the demands of 
a social superior, they do exercise a great deal of 
interpretive force. Hugh converts to reason Lady Bruton's 
absurd notion that she can sway scores of young people to 
emigrate to Canada and thus alleviate the population 
problems resulting from World War I. Lady Bruton and Hugh 
Whitbread participate in an activity which normalizes the 
disturbing results of the war and provides simple solutions 
to the unsettling problems that the dysfunctional Septimus 
Smith embodies.
Richard Dalloway also attends this luncheon at Lady 
Bruton's. Unlike Hugh, Richard observes the letter-writing 
ritual, but does not actively participate. Richard holds a
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prominent and recognizable position of political power; yet, 
he seems much less eager to impose his interpretations on 
others and respects individual meaning. He readily 
pronounces Hugh Whitbread's rhetoric "all stuffing and 
bunkum, but no harm in it" (167). However, such a dismissal
highlights Richard's own blindness to the dangers inherent
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in any effort to influence others.
In fact, Richard represents yet another constraining 
order, that of social reform. The reformer, like a Dr. 
Holmes or Bradshaw, operates under the mandate of society to 
correct trouble-spots— the displaced, the homeless, the 
jobless. The reformer attempts to provide acceptable 
solutions to problems which reveal society's inadequacies. 
While walking through London, Richard notices several such 
problems: children crossing the street unattended,
prostitutes and female vagrants (175). Richard reflects 
concerning prostitutes in particular: "The fault wasn't in
them, nor in young men either, but in our detestable social 
system and so forth" (175). Richard's comment appears a 
clear denunciation of the system, not the participants. 
However, the rather flippant tone of "and so forth" lessens 
the force of his declaration.
The encounter with the female vagrant highlights 
Richard's more passive stance. At sight of the woman, 
Richard wonders "what could be done for female vagrants"
(17 6). Despite his apparent concern, he does not ask the 
woman for an answer: "Intent he passed her; still there was
37
time for a spark between them— she laughed at the sight of 
him, he smiled good-humouredly, considering the problem of 
the female vagrant; not that they would' ever speak” (176). 
Richard does not engage the woman in conversation. She 
remains the object of idle inquiry. Ironically, Richard, 
the social reformer, does not attempt to transgress the 
social structure which dictates that a man of his class 
would not speak with a street woman. In terms of his duties 
as social reformer, Richard primarily functions to maintain 
appearances within the social structure. Seen in this 
light, he seems uncomfortably close to the doctors who sweep 
problems under the rug or out the window. Nonetheless, the 
gentle humor of this scene marks Richard as a less 
threatening guardian of the social order. A parity exists 
between Richard and the vagrant which is absent in the 
relationship between the doctors and Septimus; the vagrant 
laughs at the sight of Richard bearing flowers, while he 
smiles "good-humouredly."
Richard's interpretive moves on the personal level 
deserve examination. Like the other characters, Richard 
develops interpretations to accommodate the unknown or 
threatening which confronts him. During her luncheon, Lady 
Bruton mentions Peter Walsh's return to England. This 
reappearance of his rival sparks in Richard a case of male 
jealousy. Richard counters this uncertainty by reminding 
himself that Clarissa chose him: "But she had often said to
him that she had been right not to marry Peter Walsh; which,
knowing Clarissa, was obviously true; she wanted support.
Not that she was weak; but she wanted support" (177 emphasis 
added). Here Richard finds it necessary to develop a 
reading of Clarissa that will assuage his own feelings of 
insecurity. He reasons that Clarissa chose him because he 
offered a support she needed, a support which Peter Walsh 
could not provide. Richard justifies his own existence by 
such a reading of his wife. However, the reader will 
remember that Clarissa chose Richard not only because she 
needed support, but also because Peter demanded to share, to 
know too much. The ironic insertion of "knowing Clarissa" 
strikes a discordant note with the information which follows 
it. By stating that Clarissa married him because he could 
offer support, Richard unwittingly reveals precisely how 
little he knows about his wife. Despite his mistake, 
Richard's interpretive self-validation does comparatively 
little harm. Woolf does not portray Richard forcing such a 
reading onto Clarissa.
Regardless of Richard's very human, if slightly 
misguided interpretation, the interpretive gestures of his 
private life seem less troublesome than those of other 
figures in the novel. Clarissa notes the importance of 
individual privacy in her marriage:
And there is a dignity in people; a solitude; even 
between husband and wife a gulf; and that one must 
respect, thought Clarissa, watching him [Richard] 
open the door; for one would not part with it
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oneself, or take it, against his will, from one's 
husband, without losing one's independence, one's 
self-respect— something, after all, priceless.
(181)
Despite the fact that Richard has been planning to return 
home after his luncheon in order to say "I love you" to 
Clarissa, he does not do so. He recognizes the invasion a 
declaration of love would be and simply gives Clarissa the 
flowers: "But he could not bring himself to say he loved 
her; not in so many words" (179). Such a declaration gives 
the speaker leverage in the relationship as it forces the 
partner into a reciprocal gesture, obliquely pushing them 
into a statement which dovetails with the phrase, "I love 
you." Although Richard does not speak, he communicates with 
Clarissa, "But how lovely, she said, taking his flowers.
She understood; she understood without his speaking; his 
Clarissa" (179). Richard, perhaps rendered understandably 
insecure by the reappearance of his rival Peter Walsh, needs 
the affirmation of hearing, "I love you," yet he does not 
yield to such an impulse. In this, Richard contrasts 
sharply with Peter who makes his passionate feelings for 
Clarissa oppressively plain. Richard hesitates once more 
before leaving, "He must be off, he said, getting up. But - 
he stood for a moment as if he were about to say something; 
and she wondered what? Why? There were the roses" (181). 
Clarissa emphasizes the superfluity of words at such a 
moment; the roses have been sufficiently eloquent. The
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beauty of this moment is that neither individual has to 
vocalize their interpretation, but silently they share a 
very similar reading of the incident— a moment of 
interpretive mutuality.
Much as the pink card embodies Bradshaw's closed 
epistemology, so the roses resonate as a sign of Richard's 
methods for interpreting and establishing knowledge. Woolf 
describes Richard "grasping his red and white roses together 
(a vast bunch in tissue paper)" (174). Richard's roses are 
an unruly lot, certainly not ordered as are Bradshaw's 
cards. In fact, Richard must grasp them in a lighthearted 
gesture to prevent losing them. If the roses become a sign 
of knowledge or interpretation, then we see that Richard 
only confines out of necessity and does not do so in a very 
systematic fashion. In fact, only a thin layer of tissue 
confines them, not the hard card of Bradshaw. Richard's 
roses also underline his contrast to Peter Walsh. As he 
walks past the female vagrant, Richard bears "his flowers 
like a weapon" (176). This simile should remind readers of 
Peter Walsh who carries a weapon throughout the novel, his 
knife. The comparison presents Richard as an even 
friendlier interpretive agent, one whose weapon is nothing 
more than a bouquet of flowers meant to say "I love you," 
flowers which could easily have another meaning.
This more positive reading of Richard, however, is 
undercut slightly by an incident which shows him capable of 
imposing an interpretation on Clarissa. Clarissa reflects
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that both Richard and Peter "criticised her very unfairly, 
laughed at her very unjustly, for her parties" (183). 
Typically, Richard*s interpretation steins from his 
humanitarian agenda: "Richard merely thought it foolish of
her to like excitement when she knew it was bad for her 
heart" (183). Clarissa easily defends herself against such 
criticism: "And both were quite wrong. What she liked was
simply life" (183). Again, Richard's reading does not harm 
his wife; however, the significance of this incident lies in 
the comparison of Richard and Peter. Clarissa pairs the two 
figures, suggesting some similarity between Richard and 
Peter who, as is shown below, is a more threatening 
interpreter.
Woolf's opposition of Peter and Richard highlights 
their differing interpretive strategies. Clarissa notes 
that her relationship with Peter was one of words. They 
argued frequently and Peter often pointed out "the defects 
of her own soul" (9). Clarissa muses, "How he scolded her! 
How they argued" (9). When Peter returns to London, he 
abuses the privilege of friendship by making his distaste 
for Clarissa's life very apparent. Like Doris Kilman, Peter 
finds himself an outsider and turns for support to a type of 
intellectual superiority vaguely based on youthful socialist 
leanings. Peter attempts to reverse the power relationship- 
-placing the wealthier and more influential Clarissa in a 
lower position— by appealing to intellectual superiority. 
Woolf tempers her portrayal of Peter, however, with the
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somewhat comic phallic symbol of the knife. Peter manifests 
a need for personal authority by fidgeting with his rather 
pathetic recourse to power, his knife: 11 And he took out his
knife quite openly— his old horn-handled knife” (65).
Peter's apparently impotent knife allows for a contrast 
between himself and the more efficiently violent Dr. Holmes. 
Both Holmes and Peter make notable entries into two 
different homes. Holmes forces his way up the stairs into 
the Smith's home, and Peter rushes past the maid and up the 
stairs to Clarissa. Peter arrives at Mrs. Dalloway's home: 
»*Mrs. Dalloway will see me . . . .  Oh yes, she will see 
me,' he repeated, putting Lucy aside very benevolently, and 
running upstairs ever so quickly" (59). The contrast in 
responses to the two entries reveals a significant 
difference between Peter and Dr. Holmes. Holmes's violence 
results in Septimus's suicide, while Peter causes only a 
minor shuffle as he violates Clarissa's privacy. Clarissa's 
actions emphasize that Peter does make an invasion of sorts: 
"She made to hide her dress, like a virgin protecting 
chastity, respecting privacy" (59). When compared to Dr. 
Holmes, Peter seems a failed attempt to approximate 
masculine authority. Woolf pokes fun at Peter who through 
his knife and intrusive nature makes a show of employing 
tactics which truly do not serve him.
In addition to his failed attempts to employ more 
forceful tactics, Peter relies on a sense of intellectual 
superiority. Like the other characters, Peter is pushed
43
into an interpretation by personal insecurities. While 
Peter visits with Clarissa, his surroundings make him feel 
his own failure: "Oh yes, he had no doubt about that; he
was a failure, compared with all this— the inlaid table, the 
mounted paper-knife, the dolphin and the candlesticks, the 
chair-covers and the old valuable English tinted prints" 
(64). However, this sense of failure changes to disdain, 
much as Miss Kilman's sense of powerlessness transforms into 
pity. Peter thinks, "I detest the smugness of the whole 
affair" (65). Peter, a socialist in his youth, calls upon 
his intellectual disdain to shore up his distaste for the 
upper classes whose security he envies. Like Kilman, Peter 
is the outsider. He intends to ask Richard Dalloway to help 
him find a new post and requires an alternative system of 
interpretation to reverse his own position of relative 
powerlessness. However, unlike Kilman, Peter has enduring 
ties to Clarissa and avoids the forceful insistence 
necessary to impose his interpretation of Clarissa on his 
old friend. Thus, he does not utilize his sense of 
intellectual superiority to denounce Clarissa entirely. 
Nonetheless, the insecure Peter uses language very similar 
to Doris Kilman's: "I know what I'm up against, he thought,
running his finger along the blade of his knife, Clarissa 
and Dalloway and all the rest of them; but I'll show 
Clarissa" (69). He wants to "show Clarissa," much as Kilman 
wants "to overcome her; to unmask her" (189). Kilman wishes 
to make Clarissa cry; however, in this scene Peter is the
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one who cries, ironically linking Peter more closely to 
traditionally female traits rather than the masculine knife 
he clings to. Although he yearns to force his meaning and 
validate himself in the eyes of the Dalloway set, he is 
incapable of such a move.
Although Peter's social status is outside the ruling 
class, his personal epistemology reflects, to a certain 
extent, the eighteenth-century rationalism supporting such 
Western power structures. In fact, Clarissa acknowledges 
that for Peter knowing was simply a matter of studying and 
reading. Clarissa muses:
Take Peter Walsh now. There was a man, charming, 
clever, with ideas about everything. If you 
wanted to know about Pope, say, or Addison, or 
just to talk nonsense, what people were like, what 
things meant, Peter knew better than any one. It 
was Peter who had helped her; Peter who had lent 
her books. (192)
Thus, although Peter has landed outside the realm of the 
powerful elite, he, like Kilman, embraces the underpinnings 
of the system which banished him, perhaps seeing in logic 
and reason a structure whose methods inspire belief by their 
systematized nature. Ironically, Peter frequently knows 
very little about "what people were like," or "what things 
meant." In fact, as is seen below, he even misapprehends 
his old and intimate friend Clarissa. Peter's intellectual 
superiority seems something of a fraud; he is able to fool
45
Clarissa by his "learning," yet he lacks a genuine 
understanding of people.
The limitations of Peter's rationalism and 
intellectualism are revealed in his persistent 
misunderstanding of human beings, specifically Clarissa.
For example, after noting the elegant surroundings of 
Clarissa's drawing-room, Peter asserts, "Richard's doing, 
not Clarissa's; save that she married him" (65). While the 
objects themselves and the money that supplied them are 
Richard's "doing," the decor of the room is a direct result 
of Clarissa's own preparations for the party. In fact, 
Clarissa reflects, "But Richard had no notion of the look of 
a room" (181). Peter seems unwilling to acknowledge a part 
of Clarissa (her social savvy) which might not correspond to 
his own interpretation of her. Regarding Peter, Clarissa 
notes "his lack of the ghost of a notion what any one else 
was feeling" (69). However, in the very next line, we read: 
"I know all that, Peter thought; I know what I'm up against, 
he thought, running his finger along the blade of his knife" 
(69). The repetition of the verb "know" highlights Peter's 
own lack of self-knowledge, the fact that he knows very 
little about human relationships and finds validation for 
his misapprehension in his knife.
Significantly, Peter misunderstands Clarissa herself. 
Peter believes she gives her parties because she enjoys 
imposing herself; but Clarissa disagrees, declaring Peter 
wrong and adding, "What she liked was simply life" (18 3).
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Clarissa continues, "But could any man understand what she 
meant either? about life? She could not imagine Peter or 
Richard taking the trouble to give a party for no reason 
whatever" (184). She indicates her parties are an attempt 
to help people connect, to bring them together: "And it.was
an offering; to combine, to create; but to whom? An 
offering for the sake of offering, perhaps. Anyhow, it was 
her gift" (185). Peter's dismissal of the parties as a 
symptom of social snobbery does not account for Clarissa's 
true motivation and emphasizes his limited understanding of 
her.
While Clarissa rather successfully deflects Richard 
Dalloway's moment of interpretive imposition, she finds it 
more difficult to dispel the force of Peter's readings. 
Clarissa shows a marked disregard for Richard's efforts at 
social reform, paying little heed to whether his committee 
meets to discuss the Albanians or the Armenians (182). 
Perhaps because she finds Peter's intellectualism more 
imposing, Clarissa feels his reading of her more profoundly. 
Clarissa has difficulty laughing off Peter's analysis of her 
parties and comments on how insignificant and trivial she 
feels in Peter's presence. Clearly, his interpretation 
meets its mark.
Like Dr. Bradshaw's pink card and Richard Dalloway's 
roses, Peter's knife functions as a sign of his 
epistemology. In its potential for violence, the knife 
marks Peter as an aggressive and threatening interpreter,
one willing to use force and yet incapable of doing so. 
Phyllis Rose notes that the obvious phallic implications of 
the knife make Peter a "vaguely menacing, aggressive" figure 
(142). Clarissa herself acknowledges the knife as a means 
of imposing interpretations: "What an extraordinary habit 
that was, Clarissa thought; always playing with a knife. 
Always making one feel, too, frivolous; empty-minded; a mere 
silly chatterbox, as he used" (65). While Peter partially 
redeems himself by failing to achieve the out-moded 
masculine authority of Dr. Holmes, he must be held 
accountable for the fact that he attempts to approximate the 
force of such a position. Peter*s self-deceit and lack of 
intuition characterizes a generation of men who embrace 
rationalism yet remain ignorant to the mystery of existence 
which so fascinates Clarissa, Septimus, and Woolf herself.
Woolf emphasizes the limitations of Peter's 
intellectualism by contrasting his understanding with that 
of the less educated, yet more insightful, Clarissa.
Clarissa notes, "But Peter— however beautiful the day might 
be, and the trees and the grass, and the little girl in 
pink— Peter never saw a thing of all that. He would put on 
his spectacles, if she told him to; he would look" (9). 
Clarissa must point to things of significance, and while she 
indicates that Peter would put on his glasses and look, she 
does not affirm that he actually sees or attaches meaning to 
the natural world. The mystery of the natural world 
motivates the epistemologies of both Clarissa and Septimus
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and forms an alternative to the various orders and 
discourses vying for their allegiance. This awareness of 
the mystery of existence links Clarissa and Septimus and 
predominates Woolf's depiction of Clarissa herself.
Within the first ten pages of the novel, Woolf 
establishes Mrs. Dalloway as a woman who readily accepts the 
limited nature of knowledge and the mystery of existence.
In fact, Clarissa scoffs at any attempts to confine the 
essence of existence in the formulas of science, logic, and 
language. Her relationship with Richard upholds the 
barriers between individuals and guards against interpretive 
bullying: "For in marriage a little license, a little
independence there must be between people living together 
day in day out in the same house; which Richard gave her, 
and she him" (10). Clarissa preserves the integrity of 
individual privacy: "(Where was he [Richard] this morning
for instance? Some committee, she never asked what.)" (10). 
Clarissa refrains from asking for information as simple as 
which committee Richard is attending, setting her apart from 
the transparently villainous doctors and the more subtly 
disturbing Peter Walsh. Several questions focus this 
examination of Clarissa: 1) As do other characters, does
Clarissa develop interpretations to justify herself? 2) How 
does she function when confronted by the various orders 
surrounding her? 3) And, more importantly, what part does 
she play in the imposition of interpretation?
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Initially, Clarissa seems to resist the need to impose 
interpretations on others in that she refuses to categorize 
individuals. She determines: "She would not say of Peter,
she would not say of herself, I am this, I am that" (11).
Her refusal to classify by using the demonstrative pronoun 
suggests her acceptance of limited meaning and the infinite 
possibilities of experience. Herbert Marder notes that this 
passage reveals Clarissa's "impulse to ignore rational 
categories, to celebrate the integrity of every living 
person, without regard for creeds or doctrines" (57). 
Clarissa's stance opposes the orders of Dr. Bradshaw's 
psychiatry, Doris Kilman's Christianity, Richard's 
humanitarianism, and Peter Walsh's rationalism. She rejects 
each order's basic compulsion to classify and control what 
Foucault terms the proliferation of meaning (1164).
Despite this renunciation of categorization, Clarissa 
proceeds to use demonstrative pronouns profusely, not only 
in relation to herself, but also in her assessment of other 
individuals. In fact, only a few pages after this
renunciation, Clarissa laments that she cannot be like
Richard who does things for himself, but that she does 
things "to make people think this or that" (14). The 
appositive, "perfect idiocy she knew," qualifies the force 
of such a manipulative admission. The fact remains that 
Clarissa admits she acts in order to force people into 
thinking "this or that," a move to convince others of her 
interpretations. However, such a move to invite certain
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interpretations of herself remains worlds apart from the 
force the doctors use in treating Septimus. In addition, 
one could argue that in her "instinctive11 knowledge of 
people— "Her only gift was knowing people almost by 
instinct"—  Clarissa labels and diagnoses in much the same 
way that the physicians Holmes and Bradshaw do (11). 
Admittedly, Clarissa's "instinct" cannot command the power 
Holmes and Bradshaw wield. Instinct, as a personal form of 
knowledge, is also a devalued form of meaning in Woolf's 
society. Clarissa's instincts can only govern the small 
sphere of her home and her party, and that, too, is limited.
While Clarissa instinctively dislikes Dr. Bradshaw, his
position in society dictates that he be invited.
In entertaining Bradshaw, Clarissa finds herself 
virtually a slave to the dictates of the social system; 
however, in her treatment and classification of the lower 
class and dependent Kilman, Clarissa herself exercises that 
same class-conscious authority. Perhaps most striking, as 
Marder notes, is Clarissa's savage denunciation and 
classification of Miss Kilman as "One of those spectres who 
stand astride us and suck up half our life-blood, dominators 
and tyrants" (16-17). Marder comments ironically, "So much 
for Clarissa's refusal to pin a label on 'anyone in the
world.'" (59). Marder rightfully points out the
inconsistency in Clarissa; yet he ignores information that 
partially justifies her categorization. Marder does not 
account for the fact that the language Clarissa uses to
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describe Miss Kilman echoes that used by Woolf to discuss 
the tyrants Holmes and Bradshaw.
To some extent, Clarissa*s treatment of Miss Kilman 
actually highlights her personal restraint. Like the other 
characters, Clarissa develops interpretations which justify 
her own existence in moments of psychological insecurity. 
Wounded by Elizabeth's departure to the stores with Miss 
Kilman, Clarissa unleashes an interpretive tirade:
Love and religion! . . . How detestable, how 
detestable they are! . . . The cruelest things in 
the world . . . seeing them clumsy, hot,
domineering, hypocritical, eavesdropping, jealous, 
infinitely cruel and unscrupulous, dressed in a 
mackintosh coat, on the landing; love and 
religion. Had she ever tried to convert any one 
herself? Did she not wish everybody merely to be 
themselves? (191)
This passage seems consistent with Clarissa's earlier 
determination to refuse the use of the demonstrative 
pronouns in defining individuals and interpreting character. 
However, only a page prior to this assertion that she has 
never tried to "convert'' anyone, she thinks, "Miss Kilman, 
in a mackintosh, whom Heaven knows Clarissa would have liked 
to help" (190). Clarissa's help would be in its own way a 
form of conversion, transforming the malevolent, bitter 
woman by removing her mackintosh and creating a more 
socially acceptable, less threatening member of the
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household. Miss Kilman would be coopted by the structure 
and thus rendered powerless, no longer a threat. Such a 
move seems remarkably close to methods which Drs. Holmes and 
Bradshaw employ to subdue Septimus Smith. However, the fact 
remains that Clarissa does not perform any such act 
throughout the novel. She does not reform Miss Kilman, and 
although she dislikes "poor Ellie Henderson," she does not 
attempt to change her and grudgingly invites her to the 
party.
It would seem that to a certain degree Clarissa avoids 
the compulsion to gain power through knowledge. During her 
morning walk through London, Mrs. Dalloway proudly itemizes 
her scant collection of traditional knowledge: "How she had
got through life on the few twigs of knowledge Fraulein 
Daniels gave them she could not think. She knew nothing; no 
language, no history; she scarcely read a book now, except 
memoirs in bed" (11). Here Clarissa misapprehends herself 
because she has accepted others' views of her. She does, in 
fact, have a profound understanding of the world, a 
knowledge that exceeds the learning of Richard or Peter. 
Clarissa has had little formal or traditional education and 
finds existence itself an infinite source of meaning and 
wonder: "And yet to her it was absolutely absorbing; all
this; the cabs passing" (11). For Clarissa, existence 
defies explication by any rational system. Clarissa voices 
her skepticism:
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Why creeds and prayers and mackintoshes? when, 
thought Clarissa, that's the miracle, that's the 
mystery; that old lady, she meant, whom she could 
see going from chest of drawers to dressing-table 
. . . . And the supreme mystery which Kilman might
say she had solved, or Peter might say he had 
solved, but Clarissa didn't believe either of them 
had the ghost of an idea of solving, was simply 
this: here was one room; there another. (193)
Here Clarissa voices her strongest denunciation of what 
Foucault terms the will to truth. Herein lies her closest 
kinship with Septimus Smith. Just as Septimus conjectures 
that there may be no meaning at all, so Clarissa, in a less 
daring move, suggests that the order of reason does not 
possess the power to comprehend the mystery of existence. 
This similarity also contains the essence of the difference 
between the two characters. Septimus denies the very 
possibility of meaning while Clarissa simply asserts 
reason's inability to articulate absolute meaning.
Unlike Septimus, Clarissa will never be a great threat 
to the social structure. Clarissa has married into the 
ruling class of male authority from which she gains her own
l
social status. She is surrounded by individuals 
perpetuating various discursive orders. Thus, her more 
revolutionary leanings are controlled. Perhaps then, it is 
the safety of the ruling class which saves her from 
Septimus's fate. Woolf suggests, however, that Clarissa
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survives not simply because she is a socially advantaged 
individual. Rather, perhaps, Clarissa persists where 
Septimus dies because she allows the possibility of meaning, 
but at the same time opens the door for an alternative to 
the socially established system of rationality. In 
opposition to a system whose goal is the acquisition of 
power, Clarissa offers meaning through connection with other 
humans. Clarissa acknowledges her experience of such a 
connection:
Odd affinities she had with people she had never 
spoken to, some woman in the street, some man 
behind a counter— even trees, or barns. It ended 
in a transcendental theory which, with her horror 
of death, allowed her to believe, or say that she 
believed (for all her scepticism), that since our 
apparitions, the part of us which appears, are so 
momentary compared with the other, the unseen part 
of us, which spreads wide, the unseen might 
survive, be recovered somehow attached to this 
person or that. (232)
Clarissa hopes that somehow the human spirit survives the 
grappling and gritty life of the conscious world because of 
these unseen connections. Significantly, the quotation ends 
with her use of the demonstrative pronouns, pronouns used 
earlier as means to classify and limit individuals, meaning 
and interpretation. She no longer uses these words to 
classify, but merely to indicate the limitless possibilities
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for human connection. Through the use of the stream-of- 
conscious style, Woolf links the minds of her characters as 
they reflect upon objects suggesting that language does not 
have to be used exclusively as a means for manipulating 
knowledge, interpretations, people, or power; it can provide 
for connection, no matter how minimal, between human beings.
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